The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 36
Number 2 Parameters Summer 2006

Article 6

5-1-2006

Beware of Boldness
Conrad C. Crane

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters

Recommended Citation
Conrad C. Crane, "Beware of Boldness," Parameters 36, no. 2 (2006), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2303.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Beware of Boldness
CONRAD C. CRANE

A

t a counterterrorism conference in September 2004, then-Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers stated that the key
question senior officials needed to ask about their conduct of the Global War on
Terrorism was, “Are we being as bold and innovative as we need to be?”1 Army
Field Manual 7.0, Training the Force, states that the goals of operational deployments and major training opportunities are to enhance unit readiness and
“produce bold, innovative leaders.”2 These adjectives have now become accepted as key components of the lexicon of defense transformation. But before
the words become etched in stone, the Army and the other services should seriously think about what these terms mean for leaders, and their historical role in
the American military experience. The colloquial caution, “Be careful what
you ask for, because you just might get it,” is worth pondering.

Words Matter
As any serious student of military history knows, truly innovative
ideas usually come from staffs and subordinates. Leaders, especially at
higher levels, rarely need to be innovative themselves; instead, they must be
prepared to recognize valuable contributions from others and incorporate
them into the practices of the larger organization. Timothy Lupfer’s seminal
study on the evolution of German tactical doctrine in World War I describes
how senior German leaders incorporated the best ideas from staff officers and
junior leaders throughout the army (and from the French) to develop doctrines and practices for elastic defense-in-depth and new offensive tactics that
provided the basis for later blitzkrieg.3
In contrast, American leaders in Vietnam often actively resisted initiatives for improvement proposed by subordinates. John Nagl’s insightful
study of counterinsurgency lessons from the war in Southeast Asia concludes
that “the US Army generals who commanded MAAG-V [Military Assistance
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Advisory Group-Vietnam] and MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] repeatedly rejected innovative suggestions for changes in American
counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam.” He concludes that these senior leaders were very capable professionals, but their experience and organizational
culture limited their vision. Nagl contrasts that example with the British Army
in Malaya, which adapted much more readily to unfamiliar conditions and
quickly embraced new ideas.4
There are plenty of examples of American military leaders before
Vietnam who appreciated the contributions that innovative subordinates and
staffs had to offer, especially in World War II. Army Air Forces Commanding
General Henry “Hap” Arnold organized an advisory council of three to five
young staff officers, “the brightest I could get,” and set them up in an office
close to his. His instructions to them were straightforward: “What I want you
to do is sit down and think. Think of the problems confronting us. Think of the
solutions to those problems. Bring in new ideas. If you bring in one idea every
two or three days, I will be satisfied.”5
A well-known example of American wartime innovation is the development and application of the “Rhinoceros” or “Rhino” hedgerow buster.
This was typical of the process of decentralized adaptation that made the
American Army in Europe so successful in World War II. The brainstorm of
Sergeant Curtis G. Culin, Jr., of the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
in July 1944, the device consisted of prongs fashioned from a German roadblock that allowed a Sherman tank to force its way through a hedgerow without having to expose its vulnerable underbelly. Fifth Corps commander
Major General Leonard Gerow recognized the Rhino’s significant potential,
and he invited General Omar Bradley to view a demonstration. The First
Army commander was so impressed that he instructed his ordnance chief to
comb England for arc welding equipment and to mass-produce the devices
from beach obstacles. By the time of the great Operation Cobra attack in late
July, 60 percent of American tanks were equipped with Rhinos. To ensure surprise, none of those Shermans were allowed to go into action before Cobra.
Once the attack began, German armor was restricted to the roads, while the
Americans flanked them through the hedgerows. The tactical and psycholog-
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ical impact of Sergeant Culin’s innovation, exploited by Omar Bradley, was a
major factor in the breakout from Normandy.6
Boldness in an organization, however, must be created by the leadership, beginning at the top. The Army War College recently adopted that characteristic as one of the key traits desirable in senior leaders. Most doctrinal
proclamations of the advantages of bold leadership remain vague about the
adjective’s specific definition, however, and such a disconnect is worth examining. The copy of Webster’s New World Dictionary on my shelf opens its description of “bold” as “daring, fearless.” Cross referencing to “daring” gives us
“having or showing a bold willingness to take risks.”7 So by definition, bold
leaders are big risk-takers.
There are many reasons why senior American military leaders have
rarely been bold. Those commanders with a preponderance of resources are less
likely to feel obligated to take risks than perceived underdogs. Operating within
a coalition also can restrict options. But conservative senior leadership has been
very successful for the United States, and it avoids the significant costs and pitfalls that can result from operational and strategic gambles gone wrong. American leaders at high levels appear to have realized an important insight from
military history that comes true more often than not: Bold leaders end badly.

America’s Bold Generals
This analysis is primarily focused at the higher levels of combat leadership. Consequently, for the purposes of this article, all American generals
were examined who led in combat at army level and above during the major
wars of the 20th century.
In World War I, the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) were led by
John J. Pershing. He also served as commander of First Army until turning over
that position to Hunter Liggett in October 1918. During that same month,
Pershing created Second Army and gave it to Robert L. Bullard. This new leadership structure finished the Meuse-Argonne campaign. Pershing eventually established a Third Army also, but only for occupation duties after the Armistice.
One of the brigade commanders in the AEF rose to become the supreme commander of Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific area in World War
II, Douglas MacArthur. Under him, Walter Krueger commanded Sixth Army,
and Robert L. Eichelberger led Eighth Army. One other army, the Tenth, saw
action in the Pacific theater, where its commander, Simon Bolivar Buckner,
was killed on the island of Okinawa.
The supreme commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in the European Theater was Dwight D. Eisenhower. His senior American ground
commander in Northwest Europe was Omar Bradley, who commanded First
Army before advancing to lead Twelfth Army Group. Jacob Devers com90
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“Conservative senior leadership has been very
successful for the United States, and it avoids the
significant costs and pitfalls that can result from
operational and strategic gambles gone wrong.”

manded Sixth Army Group. Courtney Hodges commanded First Army,
George Patton the Third and Seventh, Lucian Truscott the Fifth, Alexander
Patch the Seventh, William Simpson the Ninth, and Leonard Gerow the Fifteenth. Mark Clark commanded Fifth Army before rising to take over Fifteenth Army Group in Italy.
Command climate can either engender or limit boldness, and Eisenhower has received criticism for being too conservative and restricting opportunities for audacity by his subordinates in the European theater. British
sources especially have claimed he should have taken more military risks
for a quicker victory or greater political gain. Such criticism at the time was
often motivated by nationalistic sensitivities about Bernard Montgomery’s
status or the British role in the coalition, and later by hindsight about the future Cold War. Eisenhower’s biographer grandson concedes that the general
“intended to proceed methodically, not boldly.”8 But it is difficult to argue
with success. His conservative approach was based on a careful evaluation of
many factors often explained in great detail in his memoirs.9 Was Eisenhower
the SHAEF commander sometimes too cautious? Probably. Was he also very
successful? Definitely.
Douglas MacArthur again headed a combined force in the Korean
War, serving as commander of UN Forces and Far East Command. When
MacArthur was relieved in April 1951, Matthew Ridgway took his place.
Ridgway had been leading Eighth Army after the death of Walton Walker in
December 1950. Ridgway’s successor in that post was James Van Fleet. Their
limited, controlled offensives regained the initiative and drove back the
Chinese.10 By the time the armistice was signed in 1953, Mark Clark was the
theater commander, and Eighth Army was commanded by Maxwell Taylor.
There were only a handful of senior American combat leaders in the
20th century after Korea. William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams led
the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. Norman Schwarzkopf commanded the Coalition forces that liberated Kuwait in 1991, while John Yeosock
was in charge of the subordinate Third Army in that campaign.
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Of those 25 individuals, only two, John J. Pershing and Douglas
MacArthur, fit the dictionary definition of boldness. (More discussion of
George Patton will come later.) And both ended their combat careers badly.
At the senior level, Pershing’s boldness first manifested itself during
the Punitive Expedition into Mexico chasing Pancho Villa. He employed new
technology such as motorcars and airplanes while sending “flying columns”
deep into Mexico and ignoring normal tactical deployments. Historians generally have depicted the mission as a failure, but more objective military analysts have pointed out that Pershing did disperse Villa’s bands and eliminate
that threat to the United States. Even such sympathetic observers have to admit, however, that Pershing’s high-handed activities severely antagonized
the Mexican government and brought the two countries to the brink of war.
Almost all Mexicans, regardless of their sentiments about the ongoing revolution, were unified in their resentment of Pershing’s expedition.11
The campaign in Mexico also helped prepare a cadre of officers for
leadership in World War I, and probably encouraged Pershing’s disdain for
tactics he felt were responsible for stalemate on the Western Front. While
Pershing has deservedly been praised for creating and maintaining an independent American Army, his operational record has received severe criticism.
His training programs were ineffective and sometimes counterproductive, he
ignored the hard lessons his Allies had learned in favor of a vague concept of
“open warfare” that confused his subordinates and got many killed, and he continually demanded too much from inexperienced staffs forced to deal with
complicated schemes of maneuver that would have challenged even a much
more seasoned army. The final American campaign in the Meuse-Argonne featured broken-down logistics that produced sick and hungry troops along with
immense transportation logjams, and inept tactics that achieved any success
strictly by “smothering German machine guns with American flesh.” Despite
gratuitous comments from Allies after the war about doughboy bravery, foreign leaders still considered the American Expeditionary Forces poorly organized and ignorant of modern warfare. Pershing had failed to produce an
instrument of policy capable of strengthening Woodrow Wilson’s leverage at
the peace talks.12
One of Pershing’s more talented subordinates in France was Douglas MacArthur, and the two would have a rocky relationship until the latter
rose to become Chief of Staff of the Army in the 1930s. Even as a brigadier
general in the trenches, MacArthur took great personal risks, earning seven
Silver Stars and the Distinguished Service Cross with oak leaf cluster. When
he achieved theater-level command in World War II, he proved equally willing to take risks at the operational level of war. Edward Drea’s superb study of
MacArthur’s use of ULTRA intelligence reveals that the general continually
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ignored any evidence that went against his preconceived strategic vision. The
historian expected to find that generalship in the Pacific theater was influenced by the same “ULTRA state of mind” as in European operations, but instead bold MacArthur decisions such as those regarding Biak, Leyte, and
Kyushu seemed to be made in spite of intelligence reports. According to
Drea, “A sense of destiny, not revelations from ULTRA, propelled MacArthur through the Southwest Pacific campaigns.” Often MacArthur’s instincts
were right, but at other times he benefited from Japanese ineptitude or fortuitous moves from Central Pacific forces that drew the enemy away. Yet his
risk-taking always seemed to pay off. He tried to foster a similar attitude in his
senior ground commanders, but was disappointed that Robert Eichelberger
and Walter Krueger always seemed too cautious.13
MacArthur established a command climate to encourage audacity in
his subordinates, but that could not motivate his army commanders to become
daring risk-takers. In fairness to Eisenhower, his subordinates in Europe
probably would have similarly remained cautious even if Eisenhower’s nature had tended more toward boldness. Though Krueger and Eichelberger did
not meet MacArthur’s expectations in that regard, they still must be considered very successful leaders.14
MacArthur continued his bold ways in Korea in 1950. Inchon was his
masterpiece, though it can be argued the September operation was actually too
surprisingly successful, since it forced hasty strategic decisions from unprepared policymakers in Washington and Beijing. But the dark side of boldness
was less than three months away, at Kunu-ri and Chosin Reservoir. By early
November, MacArthur’s intelligence staff was estimating Chinese strength in
Manchuria at 868,000. Denied accurate aerial reconnaissance by the intervention of Soviet-piloted MiG-15s, MacArthur still drove his divided forces toward the Yalu River. Seizing upon the promises of his Far East Air Forces
(FEAF) to create a zone of destruction in North Korea to block Chinese entry,
he cabled Washington on 9 November that he was confident “unrestricted”
airpower would provide security. He believed, or hoped, the Chinese would
never intervene, anyway. But any fears about MacArthur’s “over reliance” on
airpower, and faith in his destiny, would prove well-founded.15
Though MacArthur was not satisfied with the boldness of his ground
commanders in World War II, he got along very well with leaders of other components in the Southwest Pacific. George Kenney was an audacious air commander with MacArthur’s own instincts for risk-taking. One reason MacArthur
was so willing to accept unachievable FEAF promises in November 1950 was
because he had gotten so used to Kenney’s creative competence in World War II.
MacArthur particularly enjoyed working with the aptly nicknamed William
“Bull” Halsey, whom MacArthur considered “a real fighting admiral,” very
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“The US military does not need a culture
that encourages daring risk-taking,
especially at senior levels.”

much like himself. There was no bolder naval commander in World War II than
Halsey. His aggressive risk-taking helped win the key campaign at Guadalcanal
that started the advance to Tokyo, though American naval losses totaled 24 capital ships. Even when successful, boldness can be costly.16
Halsey’s last combat left a controversial cloud over his reputation. At
the climactic and complicated naval Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese purposefully designed a plan to exploit Halsey’s bold nature. Luring his covering
task force away with aircraft carriers virtually denuded of planes, the Japanese
managed to get a battleship force into the staging area for MacArthur’s Leyte
landings. If not for the last-minute faintheartedness of Admiral Kurita, brought
on by kamikaze-like attacks by small American escort vessels, the Japanese
could have destroyed much of the landing force and extended the war. Historians still debate the degree of Halsey’s culpability for the near-disaster, but the
fact remains that his well-known penchant for boldness was exploited by a
competent enemy.17

Good Examples, Wrongly Labeled
Many leaders touted as examples of boldness were really not daring
risk-takers. A good example is George S. Patton, Jr. He was aggressive, and
willing to take advantage of opportunities the situation presented, but as his
leadership matured he also diligently pursued methods to mitigate risk. His
dash across France is often portrayed as an illustration of audacious boldness,
but in reality it was far different. Patton was an ardent student of ULTRA, exhibiting that “ULTRA state-of-mind” lacking in MacArthur, and he paid careful attention to all sources of intelligence. Patton’s two tours as an intelligence
officer prepared him well to integrate those assets into his operations. His
Third Army G-2 (intelligence officer), Oscar Koch, always had the first say in
any planning. Patton also fostered a very close relationship with O. P. Weyland
and his XIXth Tactical Air Command, using their planes to clear the way for his
tanks and to provide security. In addition, French Resistance fighters helped
cover exposed flanks and conducted reconnaissance. Patton was not a gambler,
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and he used superior information and mobility to avoid enemy strengths and
exploit their weaknesses. He also appreciated the advantages that accurate
friendly situational awareness provided, and he established his 6th Cavalry
Group as the “Third Army Information Service.” Liaison patrols throughout
the area of operations provided a steady stream of tactical and operational data
to Army Headquarters. Patton’s reputation for having an uncanny sense of the
battlefield was not a product of instinct or destiny, but instead resulted from the
reports of his “Household Cavalry.”18
Words like “bold” and “innovative” have become buzzwords to apply
to any successful commander, but the historical record often presents a different portrayal. For instance, in October 2003 Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld addressed units at Fort Carson, Colorado, extolling them to exhibit
the same “bold, courageous, and innovative” traits of Christopher “Kit” Carson, for whom the post was named.19 Though Carson’s courage cannot be disputed, his conduct in his most senior commands was very conventional, and
usually cautious. He commanded the First New Mexico Volunteer Regiment at
the Battle of Valverde in February 1862, where Union forces under E. R. S.
Canby tried to halt the advance of Henry Hopkins Sibley’s Texans. Having
watched the Second New Mexico get shattered in its first action the day before,
Carson was careful to bring his own unit into combat slowly. When Canby deployed his forces to the battlefield, Carson requested to be put into a flank
blocking position. There he allowed his green troops to watch the developing
battle. When Canby mounted his main attack, the First New Mexico performed
very steadily in the advance. When Union forces retreated, Carson’s New Mexicans maintained good order, unlike the Second New Mexico, which again
broke. As a reward for his steady leadership, Carson was brevetted as a brigadier general of volunteers in March.20
He soon raised another regiment, the First New Mexico Cavalry, and
commanded it in campaigns against the Mescaleros, Navahos, Kiowas, and
Comanches. Though Carson might have preferred to parley with the Indians
and come to a peaceful agreement that way, he responded to the paternal prodding of his new commander James Carleton with the typical scorched-earth,
overwhelming-force operations usually mounted to defeat belligerent Native
Americans. Against the Navahos in 1863, for example, Carson persuaded
friendly Utes to help him, kept a strong force of New Mexico volunteers in the
field, and proceeded to destroy the Navaho villages, fields, and herds. By January 1864, most of the starving and bedraggled tribe had surrendered, without
having fought a single major battle. Carson had no great battlefield success in
any of his Indian campaigns, but he did wear his enemies down. His tactics
and operations were very effective, but they were not really innovative, and
they were definitely not bold.21
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The Future of Boldness
The main argument of this article is that the US military does not
need a culture that encourages daring risk-taking, especially at senior levels.
We may already be paying a price in Iraq for this new emphasis on boldness.
In a post-invasion meeting discussing the planning and force structure for reconstruction and stability operations, General Tommy Franks’ first slide for
his field commanders read, “Take as much risk coming out as you took going
in.” Such talk about accepting postwar risks alarmed retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs, but
it was too late for him to affect the course of events. The daring planning that
helped bring swift success in major combat operations did not effectively
deal with the aftermath, and contributed to the ongoing problems that continue to bedevil us in Iraq.22
In a television interview, defense analyst Andrew Krepinevich described the Army’s transformation efforts focusing on lighter, more agile
units, used in daring operations, as “Getting Custer to the Little Big Horn
faster.” There has been no military leader in American history bolder than
George Armstrong Custer, and his fate emphasizes the common eventual cost
of boldness. Arguing against this trait, which permeates current transformation doctrine, is not just an exercise in semantics. This is not a problem that
the military can just redefine away. There are already accepted meanings of
“boldness,” and its emphasis encourages a mindset that accepts high risks for
the potential of great gain. But this mindset too often neglects to consider the
downside of such actions, and that eventually the odds catch up with daring
commanders. And one wonders how our society, or military, would respond
to a modern Little Big Horn.
George Patton remains a fine role model for future leaders. Instead
of promoting boldness, we should be advocating the aggressive exploitation
of opportunities, with due concern to mitigate risks. The US military still does
not do well with systematic risk assessment, as was revealed in Iraq, and this
is a fertile field for future research and doctrine development. Commanders
must also encourage innovation throughout their organizations and be prepared to recognize and reward the ideas of subordinates, to create the same atmosphere of decentralized adaptation that was so successful for the American
Army in World War II. As the Commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, General William Wallace, is fond of saying, “No one of us is
smarter than all of us together.”
In the end, there is no substitute for decisionmaking based on a thorough evaluation of intelligence, comprehensive situational awareness, and
sound judgment. Destiny is not a method.
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